When the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was approved in 1948 by the UN General Assembly, the government of Saudi Arabia abstained, on grounds that the Declaration did not acknowledge rights to be the gift of God and violated the Qur'an by asserting a right to change one's religion. However, the Muslim foreign minister of Pakistan, Muhammed Zufrullah Khan, defended his country's support for the Declaration on the grounds that the Qur'an permits one to believe or disbelieve.

This issue is one of the several that continue to be debated among Muslims. Ann Elizabeth Mayer notes that Muslims "are currently deeply divided among themselves on the question of what kinds of human rights protections Islam provides."1 Moreover, she argues that where contemporary governments have used Islamic criteria the result has been to limit the exercise of human rights.

Yet today Muslim countries throughout the world have ratified international human rights covenants, and Muslim lawyers and scholars are quick to assert that Islam has always supported human rights.

Foundations

For example, Mohammed Allal Sinaceur argues that contemporary human rights are recognized as compatible with Islam: "Human rights in Islam are human rights in the light of Islam, Islam as the outward medium through which its believers attain their true value, through which is realized the right to right(s) and the right to truth."2 He identifies five basic principles in Islam which legitimate human rights: the primacy of the life and dignity of the human person, the protection against restraint on religion, respect for the dwelling, the right of asylum, and the duty of care for others.

The text from the Qur'an fundamental to all human rights reads: "that whoso slays a soul not to retaliate for a soul slain, nor for corruption done in the land, shall be as if he had slain (hu)mankind altogether."3 In Islam the human person has absolute value, because the individual is humankind as a whole: "The value of the individual is neither numerical nor rational nor social; it is the gift of God himself, a gift to man as such -- without regard either for attributes of civilization or for historic renown or for the excellence of his self-consciousness."4

Another Muslim scholar, Abdul Aziz Said, notes that "Human rights are concerned with the dignity of the individual -- the level of self-esteem that secures personal identity and promotes human community. While the pursuit of human dignity is universal, its forms are designed by the cultures of people."5 Thus, he argues, "The character and nature of human rights are determined in the crucible of a specific sociopolitical culture."6

In an Islamic culture, the state has the responsibility of enforcing the principles of the Shari'a: "the laws derived from the Qur'an, the Sunnah -- the Hadith and decisions of Muhammad, Ijma' -- the consensus of opinion of the Ulama (Judges) and Ijtihad -- the counsel of judges on a particular case."7 As sovereignty belongs to God, the state exists not merely to protect its citizens but to achieve social justice. Thus "it is the state's duty to enhance human dignity and alleviate conditions that hinder individuals in their efforts to achieve happiness."8

Freedom

From this cultural perspective, Said argues that the Western liberal emphasis on freedom from restraint is alien to Islam. Freedom in Islam is not the ability to act, but the ability to become. "The jurists see human freedom in terms of personal surrender to the Divine Will. Freedom is not an inherent right. . ..The goal of freedom is human creativity. Freedom is defined as belonging to the community, and participating with the people in cultural creation."9

Basharat Ahmad agrees: "It was the Holy Qur'an which for the first time preached the gospel of human freedom with such zeal and emphasis that the whole world woke up, as it were, from deep sleep."10 However, this human freedom must be understood, as Seyyed Hossein Nasr puts it, as the freedom to do what is right. As pure freedom belongs to God alone, "the more we are, the more we are free."11

According to the Shari'a, human rights are "a consequence of human obligations and not their antecedent": "We possess certain obligations toward God, nature, and other humans....As a result of fulfilling these obligations, we gain certain rights and freedoms that are again outlined by the Divine Law."12

Thus democracy is understood differently in Islamic culture than in the West. As all members of a society are responsible to God, all share equally in delegating authority to the state. In the words of Pakistani Abul A'la Mawdudi: "In Western democracy, the people are sovereign; in Islam sovereignty is vested in God and the people are His caliphs or representatives."13

Enforcement

Fouad Zakaria agrees that "the basic foundation of the concept of human rights, in the contemporary Muslim Arab mind, is religious."14 He admits, however, that this "sacredness" of human rights was fully recognized for only a brief time in Islam and that the rulers who came after the age of the Prophet and the four Rightful or Orthodox Caliphs have distorted "the true Islamic rule."15 Thus in Islam human rights are not associated with history at all, but with the ancient precepts of the Qur'an and its early enforcements.

From a contemporary perspective, Zakaria suggests, the concept of human rights "is theocentric; in it man counts only as far as he is a reflection of divine nature. It is non-historical, or rather it freezes a certain moment of history and holds fast to it till the very end, thus doing away with dynamism, mobility and historical development. Finally, it is non-empirical; it does not depend on long and graduated practice in widening the scope of human rights, but seeks to imitate a theoretical and spiritual ideal, while completely disregarding the effect of practice on this theoretical ideal."16 Thus there is not only a great divide between theory and practice but few tools of interpretation are available in the tradition to bridge this gap.

Religious Freedom

The practical problems are aptly illustrated by conflict over religious freedom. The conclusions of a 1980 Seminar on Human Rights, organized by the International Commission of Jurists, the University of Kuwait, and the Union of Arab Lawyers, call upon Islamic states to guarantee the rights of non-Muslims, including their right "to practice their religious belief, conduct their ceremonies, pursue their professions, vocations and other activities and benefit like everyone else from public revenues such as state assistance and aid."17 Yet clearly Islamic societies have not always recognized religious freedom. Muslim scholar Abdullah Ahmed An-Na'im even argues that "discrimination on grounds of religion or belief is fundamental to traditional Shari'a law."18

Others, such as John Kelsay, assert that in the modern era, at least, there is greater diversity of belief within Islam than is often acknowledged. He notes that Muhammed Ali Jinnah, the "Great Leader" of Pakistan, affirmed religious freedom in his presidential address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on 11 August 1947. Kelsay writes: "Whatever the case for Jinnah's status as a religious thinker, it is certainly true that his statement in the 11 August speech, as well as Zufrullah Khan's comment at the United Nations, would have been in accord with certain tendencies in Indo-Pakistan Islam at the time."19

As evidence for this position, Kelsay notes that the popular work by Amir 'Ali, The Spirit of Islam, which was first published in 1891 and went through several editions, presents a view of Islam which is not in conflict with modern notions of freedom of conscience. Amir 'Ali writes: "By the laws of Islam, liberty of conscience and freedom of worship were allowed and guaranteed to the followers of every creed under Moslem dominion. The passage in the Koran, "Let there be no compulsion in religion,' testifies to the principle of toleration and charity inculcated by Islam. 'If thy Lord had pleased, verily all who are in the world would have believed together.' 'Wilt thou then force men to believe when belief can come only from God?'"20

Muhammed Zufrullah Khan, Muhammed Ali Jinnah, and Amir 'Ali all argue for freedom of conscience on the basis of the statement in the Qur'an that there is to be no compulsion in religion. Sultanhussein Tabandeh, leader of the Islamic Ne'ematullahi Sultanalishahi Sufi Order in Iran, takes a different position. In a book entitled A Muslim Commentary on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, he asserts that freedom of thought, conscience and belief are acceptable within Islamic teachings, but that "No one's freedom gives him the right to blaspheme or to curse God, His Prophets or His Saints."21

This means religious minorities "who follow the one true God and the revelation given to a prophet of His," such as Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians, can pursue their religious practice freely: "But followers of a religion of which the basis is contrary to Islam, like those who demand Islam's extirpation, have no official rights to freedom of religion in Islamic countries or under an Islamic government, nor can they claim respect for their religion, any more than in certain countries definite political parties which are contrary to the ideology of the regime can claim freedom since they are declared to be inimical to the welfare of that land and people."22

In addition to stressing that the common good limits religious liberty, Sultanhussein Tabandeh argues -- much as the Christian theologian Augustine did in the fourth century C.E. -- that freedom of religion should not be interpreted as allowing people to reject the truth, for no one would knowingly endanger his or her salvation. Thus, conversion should be restricted to giving up "some other religion than Islam in order to accept Islam's sound faith."23

Abdulaziz A. Sachedina suggests that the division in Islam over religious freedom can be traced back to a controversy between the Mu'tazilite and Ash'arite schools of dialectical theology. The Mu'tazilite school supports the notion that religious belief and practice cannot be compelled, because it is God "who grants or withholds the gift of faith, who either makes the heart receptive to warnings or hardens it upon unsatisfactory actions or attitudes on the part of an individual."24 In this tradition God's guidance may be known through the natural order, by reason, as well as through revelation.

The exegetes of the Ash'arite school believe that the will of God is only known through Islamic law. Moreover, they interpret the Qur'an to mean that only the "People of the Book" -- Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians -- are to be allowed freedom of religious practice, as these peoples have God's guidance through Scripture. They also point out that the Prophet supported compelling idol worshippers, as well as those who renounced Islamic faith, to accept Islam.

Clearly, as understood by some Muslim commentators, the Qur'an supports religious liberty; but many Muslim commentators argue for a strictly limited understanding of this freedom. And historically, as with Christian culture, Islamic culture has feared and resisted freedom of religion and conscience.

In Islamic culture legal capacity has traditionally been determined by one's religion, with only Muslims being recognized as full citizens of the state. Of course, the treatment of non-Muslims in Muslim countries varied greatly from country to country and from era to era. However, Muslims have often held that "A Muslim who abandons Islam, whether or not he or she subsequently embraces another faith, is guilty of the crime of apostasy, which is punishable by death under Shari'a law."25 Christians and Jews, as followers of Scripture which Muslims believe to be divine, have frequently enjoyed a limited degree of independence, as "People of the Book" or Dhimmas. However, Abdullah Ahmad An-Na'im asserts that "even the best Dhimma system in conception and implementation would still discriminate against Christians and Jews and violate their religious freedom."26

An-Na'im argues that the Islamic tradition can be reformed, along the lines advocated by the late Sudanese scholar Ustadh Mahmoud Mohmed Taha, who "did not propose to discard any part of the Qur'an or undermine its divine nature" but suggested "that Muslims should undertake modern legislation to enact those verses of the Qur'an which were previously deemed to be abrogated in the sense that they were not made the source of legally binding rules (ayat al-ahkam)."27

With respect to religious liberty, M. Taha argued: "that the verses emphasizing freedom of choice and individual responsibility for such choice before God should be the bases of modern Islamic law. To do that, Muslims need to abrogate the verses of compulsion and discrimination against non-Muslims, in the sense of denying them legal efficacy in modern Islamic law. Such verses shall remain part of the holy Qur'an for all purposes except the purpose of legally binding rules. In other words, in the same way that early Muslim jurists employed the technique of abrogation (naskh) to rationalize and develop a body of law for their time, modern Muslim societies should undertake a similar process in order to develop a body of law for modern society."28

Without changes in the Shari'a such as these, An-Na'im argues, it will hardly be an instrument of religious freedom. Furthermore, the "immediate and total implementation of Shari'a demanded by Muslim fundamentalists would make a difficult situation completely intolerable."29

Conclusion

In conclusion, therefore, one cannot say that Islam either supports or does not support religious freedom. Clearly, not all Muslims support religious freedom, and some interpretations of the Qur'an support religious freedom whereas others do not. It is also clear that, in general, Islamic culture has resisted religious freedom, as has Christian culture, for religious freedom marks a loss of authority for religious leaders and the rise of pluralistic culture.

Today, some Muslims assert that Islamic culture can only be revived, after centuries of Western oppression, by enforcing the Shari'a and denying individual freedoms which undermine it, including religious freedom as set forth in international law. Other Muslims argue that for Islamic culture to be renewed, it must embrace fundamental human rights, including the right to religious freedom, because human dignity is a gift of God and thus faith cannot be coerced but must be freely chosen.

Notes

1 Ann Elizabeth Mayer, "The Dilemmas of Islamic Identity," in Human Rights and the World's Religions, ed. Leroy S. Rouner (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1980), 94.

2 Mohammed Allal Sinaceur, "Islamic Tradition and Human Rights," in Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights (Paris: UNESCO, 1986), 211.

3 Ibid., 212. (Qur'an 5:32)

4 Ibid., 213.

5 Abdul Aziz Said, "Human Rights in Islamic Perspectives," in Human Rights: Cultural and Ideological Perspectives, ed. Adamantia Pollis and Peter Schwab (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979), 86.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid., 87.

8 Ibid.

9 Abdul Aziz Said and Jamil Nasser, "The Use and Abuse of Democracy in Islam," in International Human Rights: Contemporary Issues, ed. Jack L. Nelson and Vera M. Green (Stanfordvile, N.Y.: Human Rights Publishing Group, Earl M. Coleman, 1980), 76-77.

10 Basharat Ahmad, "Qur'anic View of Human Freedom," The Islamic Review 5, nos. 1,2, and 3 (October, November, December 1984): 9.

11 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, "The Concept and Reality of Freedom in Islam and Islamic Civilization," in The Philosophy of Human Rights, ed. Alan S. Rosenbaum (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980), 96.

12 Ibid., 97.

13 Abul A'la Mawdudi, Human Rights in Islam (Leicester, U.K.: Islamic Foundation, 2d ed. 1980), 10.

14 Fouad Zakaria, "Human Rights in the Arab World: the Islamic Context," in Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights, 228.

15 Ibid., 230.

16 Ibid., 237. Zakaria observes that the Iranian Revolution represents a notable exception.

17 Human Rights in Islam (Geneva: International Commission of Jurists, 1982), 7-8.

18 Abdulahi Ahmed An-Na'im, "Religious Freedom in Egypt: Under theShadow of the Islamic Dhimma System," in Religious Liberty and Human Rights in Nations and in Religions, ed. Leonard Swidler (Philadelphia: Ecumenical Press, Temple University, 1986), 55.

19 John Kelsay, "Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights," in Human Rights and the Conflict of Cultures: Western and Islamic Perspectives on Religious Liberty (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1998), 43-44.

20 Amir 'Ali, The Spirit of Islam (London: Methuen, 1967), 212; quoted in John Kelsay, "Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights," in Human Rights and the Conflict of Cultures, 45.

21 Sultanhussein Tabandeh, A Muslim Commentary on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, trans. F.J. Goulding (London: F.T. Goulding & Company, English edition, 1970), 70.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid., 72.

24 Abdulaziz A. Sachedina, "Freedom of Conscience and Religion in the Qur'an," in Human Rights and the Conflict of Cultures, 67.

25 Ibid.

26 Abdulahi Ahmed An-Ma'im, "Religous Freedom in Egypt: Under the Shadow of the Islamic Dhimma System," 56. Ustadh Mahmoud Mohmed Taha was executed by former President Numeiri of Sudan on 18 January 1985, because he opposed the immediate total implementation of Islamic Shari'a law without undertaking the reform process he advocated. Numeiri was overthrown three months later.

27 Ibid., 59.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 May 1992.